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I. INTRODUCTION

During thirty-six years of civil war, Guatemalans suffered atrocious
human rights violations. Finally, in 1996, the Agreement on a Firm and
Lasting Peace ended the war between the State of Guatemala and the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), a leftist guerilla
group.' The signing of the final peace accord and the cessation of
hostilities also marked a significant departure from state-sponsored human
rights violations. Peace and increasing respect for human rights, however,
have not entailed the end to the impunity that permeated Guatemala
throughout its lengthy civil war. Perpetrators of human rights violations
occupy leadership positions in the government, military, and political
parties. A government lacking the will and resources to instigate
controversial prosecutions and a corrupt and inefficient judicial system
perpetuate the atmosphere of impunity.
Although many observers had hoped that a truth commission would
help initiate efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes, this
wish has not materialized. The Commission for Historical Clarification in
Guatemala 2 produced a comprehensive report on the human rights
violations that occurred during the war. Despite this account and the
Commission's recommendations in favor of prosecuting both the material
and intellectual authors of the abuses, holding perpetrators individually
accountable for their crimes remains an exception to the rule of impunity.
In light of the disturbing impunity in Guatemala, one wonders whether
the CEH could have done more to promote justice and accountability.
Specifically, should the Commission have identified the names of
individual perpetrators in its report? This Article advances the argument
that, despite persuasive reasoning in favor of naming names, the
Commission correctly decided against doing so. General structural
limitations of truth commissions and specific restrictions in the CEH's
mandate strongly militated against identifying individual perpetrators.
Although one might construe the Commission's decision as a blow to
the goal of individual accountability, an examination of the circumstances
that led to the decision reveals its validity. Part II, of this Article, details
the report of the CEH, including its conclusions about the war and certain
recommendations to deter future human rights violations. Part III
considers the current reality of impunity in Guatemala, paying specific

attention to the state of the judicial system, the current crime wave
plaguing Guatemala, and the government's response to the crime wave.
Part IV examines in depth the establishment of the CEH and its mandate.

Finally, Part V analyzes the CEH's decision not to name names in light of
1. Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec. 29, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 274.
2. Hereinafter CEH or Commission.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss3/3
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its mandate, the structural confines of truth commissions, and the goal of
individual accountability for human rights violations.
II. THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION IN GUATEMALA
The Accord of Oslo of June 23, 1994, established the Commission for

Historical Clarification to investigate and report upon the acts of violence
and human rights violations that occurred during the civil war. The CEH,
although an independent entity, received financial support from the
European Union, several European countries, Japan, the United States, and

the United Nations." It consisted of three members: Christian Tomuschat,
a German professor and human rights expert, Otilia Lux de Coi, an
indigenous Guatemalan education expert, and Alfredo Balsells Tojo, a
Guatemalan lawyer.' On February 25, 1999, after an eighteen-month
investigation, the CEH fulfilled its mandate and presented its findings to
representatives of the Guatemalan government, the URNG, the United
Nations, and the public.6
A. ConclusionsAbout the War
The CEH estimated that over 200,000 people disappeared or were
killed during the thirty-six year war.7 It registered 42,275 victims, of
whom over 23,000 were victims of arbitrary executions and over 6,000
were victims of disappearances." Of the fully-identified victims, eightythree percent were Mayan and seventeen percent were Ladino.'
1. The State of Guatemala and Human Rights Atrocities
Although it did not commit all of the human rights abuses that occurred
during the war, the State of Guatemala perpetrated the overwhelming
majority of them." The Commission attributed to the State ninety-three
3. Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights
Violations and Acts of Violence that have caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, June 17,
1994, 36 ILM 283 [hereinafter Oslo Agreement].
4. GUATEMALA: MEMORY OF SILENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMSSION FOR HISTORICAL
CLARwICATION: CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS, ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (I999)[hereinafter
MEMORY OF SILENCE]; Christian Tomuschat, Between National and International Law:

Guatemala'sHistoricalClarificationCommission, in LIBER AMICORUM GONTER JAENICKE 991,
1004-05 (Christiane Philipp ed., 1998) [hereinafter Between Nationaland InternationalLaw].
5. Between National and International Law, supra note 4,at 994; Mireya Navarro,
GuatemalanArmy Waged "Genocide, " New Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at AI.
6. It
7. MEMoRY OF SiLENCE, supra note 4, at 17.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The CEl considers the State responsible not only for human rights violations
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percent of the human rights violations and acts of violence registered
during the eighteen-month investigation." Throughout the war, the State
employed a strategy ofterror against its enemies, committing human rights
violations publicly and with extreme brutality.' Among the abuses
attributable to the State are six hundred and twenty-six massacres of
indigenous Guatemalans and myriad disappearances, arbitrary executions,
and rapes.' 3 These abuses "resulted in the complete extermination of many
Mayan communities, along with their homes, cattle, crops, and other
elements essential to survival."' 4
Not surprisingly, the CEH concluded that the State committed "grave
violations of international human rights law."" The State violated
international customary law by not adhering to the precepts of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of
the Rights and Obligations of Man, both of which Guatemala approved in

1948.6 Furthermore, the Guatemalan State blatantly committed acts in
violation of Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, including
"attacks against life and bodily integrity, mutilation, cruel treatment,

torture and torment, the taking of hostages, attacks on personal dignity,
and particularly humiliating and degrading treatment, including the rape
of women."' 7
In addition to its assessment of the human rights violations committed
during the war, the CEH determined that the Guatemalan State committed
genocide against its citizens between 1981 and 1983." Using the legal
framework of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 9 the Commission found that the State acted with the
intent to destroy particular ethnic groups and committed genocide based
on Article II(a), (b), and (c) of the Convention.2" During these years, in
particular, the Army operated with an extremely expansive definition of
the enemy against whom it was fighting.2' This expansive definition
"perpetrated by its public servants and state agencies," but also for "actions of civilians to whom

it delegated, dejure or defacto, authority to act on its behalf; or with its consent, acquiescence or
knowledge." Id. at 33. This definition includes members of the military and "any other third party
that may have acted under the direction or with the knowledge of state agents." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 26.
13. Id.at 34-35.
14. Id. at 34.
15. Id. at 37.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Guatemala ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide on November 30, 1949. Id.at 38.
20. Id.
at 39.
21. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss3/3
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included civilian members of particular Mayan ethnic groups in the four
geographical areas where the State committed genocide.' In these areas,
the Army targeted the Mayan communities for destruction because of their
suspected sympathy or support for the guerillas.'
Because the CEH interpreted its mandate as prohibiting it from
assigning individual responsibility for the atrocities that occurred, it only
assigned institutional responsibility.24 The Commission assigned
responsibility for the human rights violations and genocide to the highest
levels of the Guatemalan Army and State.2 It concluded that the majority
of the human rights violations "occurred with the knowledge or by order
of the highest authorities of the State,"26 and that the genocidal acts "were
the product of a policy pre-established by a command superior to the
material perpetrators."' Since the highest levels of the State developed
and implemented these policies, the CEH claimed that responsibility for
the atrocities reaches to the chiefs of staff for national defense and the
Presidents of Guatemala.2 ' By assigning responsibility to the presidents
and chiefs of staff of the military, the CEH informed its readers of the
identities of certain perpetrators, without actually naming names or
violating the prohibition against assigning individual responsibility.29
2. The URNG and Human Rights Atrocities

While the State of Guatemala committed the overwhelming majority
of human rights abuses, the guerillas are not free of blame. The CEH
attributed three percent of the violations to the guerillas.3" Those violations
include thirty-two massacres, arbitrary executions, forced disappearances,
and kidnappings."
The Commission asserted that the guerillas' actions violated Common
Article III of the Geneva Conventions.' Since the violations often
occurred either upon the explicit orders of the guerilla high command or
with the knowledge of the highest ranking guerilla commanders, the CEH

22. Id.

23. Id.
24. Christian Tomuschat, Lessons Learned from the Historical Clarification Commission in
Guatemala 8 (unpublished paper delivered at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies
Association) (on file with the Latin American Studies Association, University of Pittsburgh).
25. MEMORY OF SILENCE, supra note 4, at 38, 41.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Between National andInternationalLaw, supra note 4, at 1002.
30. MEMORY OF SILENCE, supra note 4, at 42.
31. Jd. at 42-43.

32. Id. at 43.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
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assigned responsibility for the violations to the highest levels of the
guerillas' organic structure."
B. Recommendationsfor Guatemala
In accordance with the OSLO Agreement, the CEH included various

recommendations in its report. The recommendations concern the
treatment of victims of human rights abuses, the need to promote the
observance of human rights in Guatemala, the need to strengthen
democracy in Guatemala, as well as other suggestions.
Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, the CEH made
recommendations aimed at ending impunity in Guatemala. It advocated a
strengthening of the judicial system and it urged the State to prosecute the

perpetrators of crimes for which the National Reconciliation Law34 did not

extinguish liability, "paying particular attention to those who instigated
and promoted these crimes. " 3s
Il.

THE REALITY OF IMPUNITY

IN GUATEMALA

A. The GuatemalanJudicialSystem
Unfortunately, the impunity that prevented the wartime prosecution of
human rights perpetrators remains a serious problem in Guatemala. The
country's judicial system appears incapable of ending widespread
impunity for the perpetrators of human rights abuses that occurred both
during and after the civil war. Similar to its status during the thirty-six year
armed conflict, the judicial branch remains a weak and ineffective
component of the government. The domestic courts have repeatedly
demonstrated an inability to ensure due process for defendants and fair
trials for either party in both civil and criminal litigation. 36 The judicial
system suffers notably from inefficiency, corruption, and insufficient
funds and personnel." Threats, intimidation, violence, and murder

33. Id. at 44.

34. The National Reconciliation Law is an amnesty law passed after the signing of the final
peace agreement. It "extinguishes penal responsibility for crimes committed by both sides during
the war, with the exception of forced disappearances, torture, and genocide." Naomi Roht-Arriaza
& Lauren Gibson, The DevelopingJurisprudenceon Amnesty, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 843, 851 (1998);
Ley de Reconciliacion Nacional, Decreto Numero 145-96, Dec. 18, 1996.
35. MEMORY OF SILENCE, supra note 4, at 58.
36. U.S. Department of State, Guatemala Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1998, at 2, at http://www.state.gov./www/global/human-rights/1998hrpreport/guatemal.html
(Feb. 26, 1999) (last visited May 1, 2001).
37. U.S. Department of State, Guatemala, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
2000, at 8, 15-16, http:J/www.state.gov/g/drrls/hrrpt/2000/wha/index.cfin (Feb. 2001) (last visited

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss3/3
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committed against judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and victims and their
family members further impede the effective administration of justice.3 s
Because of the weak condition of the judicial system, most perpetrators of
human rights abuses face no current threat of prosecution for the crimes
they committed.
The reality of impunity for past abuses exists on all levels of the
judicial system and for almost all categories of perpetrators. Because of
intimidation and corruption, prosecutors fail to indict many of those
responsible for wartime atrocities.39 Of the minority of perpetrators who
are tried, many are found not guilty due to ineffective prosecution or
threats and intimidation against witnesses.4
Although there have been isolated cases of prosecutions of human
rights violators, these prosecutions have often led to unsettling results.
Most guilty verdicts are against former members of the civilian defense
patrols (PACs), which the Army created as part of its anti-insurgency
campaign in the indigenous areas.4 ' The PACs committed myriad human
rights violations during the war, and those PAC members who committed
the violations should be held accountable; however, one must remember
that the PACs were an integral part of the State's broad counterinsurgency
strategy. They typically committed violations on the orders of the military
or in tandem with the military.42 Therefore, it is unjust that the elite
members of Guatemala's military and political class continue to evade
legal responsibility for the policies that they developed and implemented,
while PAC members bear the brunt of prosecution. It appears that "[o]nce
again, Guatemala's poor are paying the greatest price for the armed
conflict, not just as victims, but also among those punished for carrying
out the government campaign of terror."' 3
Finally, even a guilty verdict does not necessarily entail the end to
impunity for a perpetrator of human rights abuses. Because of perceived
May 1,2001) [hereinafter U.S Departmentof State -2000]; U.S. Department of State, Guatemala,
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1999,
at 2,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-.ights/1999 hrp-report/guatemal.html (Feb. 25,
2000)(last visited May 1, 2001)[hereinafter U.S. Department of State--1999].
38. U.S. Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 8, 15-16; U.S. Department of State
1999, supra note 37, at 10. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000: Guatemala: Human
Rights Developments, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/americas/guatemala.html (last visited May 9,
2001).
39. U.S. Department of State - 1999, supra note 37, at 19.
40. U.S. Department of State - 1999, supra note 37, at 22.
41. Patrick Ball, AAAS/ CIIDH database of human rights violations in Guatemala, at
http://hrdataaaas.org/ciidh/datahtml (last modified January 29, 2000)[hereinafter AAAS/CIIDH
database]; Robert Trudeau & Lars Schoultz, Guatemala, in CONFRONTING REVOLtImON: SECURITY
THROUGH DiPOMAcy IN CENRAL AdERCA 41 (Morris J. Blachman, et al. eds., 1986).
42. AAAS/CIIDH database, supra note 41.

43. Id.
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"technical deficiencies or procedural shortcomings," Guatemalan courts
have annulled or reversed convictions for wartime human rights violations

with unsettling frequency." Many observers believe that the abandonment
of guilty verdicts is the result of intimidation and corruption in the
judiciary.4' This phenomenon erodes any confidence that Guatemalans

have in their judicial system and enhances the atmosphere of impunity.
B. The Crime Wave and the State 's Reaction
Despite an increase in threats and harrassment of human rights activits
and killings of community leaders in 2000," human rights conditions in
Guatemala have improved significantly since the end of the war.
Unfortunately, the country currently suffers from widespread criminal
activity. Unlike during the war, this crime wave is not a State-sponsored
attempt to eliminate its enemies. Although different in nature from the
wartime human rights abuses, one can trace much of the criminal activity
that affects Guatemala today to the impunity that has and continues to
shield criminals from liability.
The demobilization of thousands of Army soldiers, branches of the
State's security apparatus, and the guerillas has directly contributed to the
rash of violent crime plaguing Guatemala.4' These former combatants
came of age and fought in a thirty-six year civil war that fostered a culture
of violence and impunity. It is not surprising, then, that organized gangs
of former military, police, and guerillas contribute significantly to the
alarmingly high rates of murder, kidnapping, and theft.4 Because of the
lack of sufficient resources for police and prosecutors and the paralysis of
the judicial system, these criminals operate with the same impunity that
existed during the war."
In addition to the loss of life and property, the wave of violent crime
has had serious consequences on both the people's confidence in their
government and the prospect of demilitarization in Guatemala. "Popular
frustration with the inability of the Government to control crime, and of
the courts to assure speedy justice, as well as a tradition of extrajudicial
repression of crime during years of military rule" has led to eruptions of

44. U.S. Department of State

-

1999, supra note 37, at 19.

45. Id.
46. U.S. Department of State- 2000, supra note 37, at 10; Human Rights Watch, World
Report 2000;
Guatemala:
Human Rights Developments,
at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/americas/guatemala.html (last visited May 9,2001).
47. U.S. Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 10.
48. Guatemala Wracked by Crime on Peace Pact Anniversary, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 29,
1997, at A15.
49. Guatemala: Unchecked Crime Undermines Peace Process, ECOCENTRAL: CENTRAL
AMERICAN ECONOMY,

Feb. 5, 1998, LEXIS, IAC(SM) Newsletter Database.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss3/3
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mob violence." Frequently, groups of outraged citizens lynch or burn alive
suspected criminals.5 These outbursts reflect the people's belief that
"popular justice" is the only option for combating impunity.
Equally alarming is the Government's decision to use the Army, in
conjunction with the National Civil Police (PNC), to maintain peace and
security and control criminal activity. 2 The remilitarization of police
operations has led to the Army's construction of new bases and the
reopening of bases that it had closed at the end of the war.-3 Human Rights
Watch comments that "although the police were nominally in command
of the joint patrols . . . the army truly controlled and numerically
dominated the patrols." 5' With the Army in control again, renewed human
rights violations will likely occur. Observers already fear that a high
percentage of the murders were "actually extrajudicial'assassinations of
gangsters by security forces or paramilitary squads" involving both torture
and "death-squad style" executions." Given the state of impunity enjoyed
by the military, it is only logical that past perpetrators of human rights
violations have continued to commit similar abuses.

IV.

REVISITING THE COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION

A. CEH." The Political Compromise
Considering the serious lack of meaningful accountability for past
abuses, the CEH's decision not to name names takes on added
significance. Before passing judgment on its decision, one must first
understand how the CEH came into existence and relevant details of the
mandate that governed its actions.
At the time of a truth commission's establishment, the sponsoring
parties provide the commission with a mandate that defines its goals,
procedures, and powers.' Ideally, the parties will incorporate civil society,

50. U.S. Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 10; U.S. Department of State1999, supra note 37, at 14.
51. U.S. Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 10; U.S. Department of State1999, supra note 37, at 14.
52. US. Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 14. On March 21, 2000, the Congress
of Guatemala enacted a law officially authorizing the army to support the police in crime fighting
activities. "Under the new law, military personnel are not subordinated clearly to police control"
during joint operations-we need source. Id at 1.
53. Guatemala: Unchecked Crime Undermines Peace Process, supra note 48. U.S.

Department of State - 2000, supra note 37, at 10.
54. Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999: Guatemala: Human Rights Developments,
at http//www.hrw.orgfhrw/worldreport99/americas/guatemala.html (last visited on Feb. 26, 2000).
55. Guatemala:Unchecked Crime Undermines Peace Process, supra note 48.
56. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, AccouNTABmLrrY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
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including human rights NGOs and representatives of victims, into the
process of creating the mandate." For example, the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission held public hearings and discussions to
help determine how it should function." Unfortunately, the public
participation that occurred in South Africa is the exception rather than the
norm. The public rarely plays a role in drafting a truth commission's
mandate. 9 The agreement establishing the CEH and its mandate reveals
a political compromise between the State of Guatemala and the URNG,
with little or no public participation.' The resulting weaknesses in the
CEH's mandate reflect both the military's powerful position and the
exclusion of civil society from the negotiating process.
To a certain extent, the URNG could laud any agreement creating a
truth commission as a political and diplomatic victory. Throughout the
peace talks, the subject of a truth commission presented an extremely
contentious issue. On several instances, the negotiations stalled because
the Guatemalan military strongly opposed the URNG's demands for a
truth commission."' The Army opposed the creation of any truth-telling
body, arguing that its actions in "clamping down on suspected subversives
and that any truth commission
have been within the law, and its duty,"
"would merely rekindle old hatreds." 2 Although the State's position
eventually became more flexible, Guatemala's Minster of Defense,
General Enrique Moralez, insisted that the military would not tolerate any
truth commission that identified perpetrators by name. This prerequisite
stifled any hope that a truth commission could substantially further the
goal of individual accountability for human rights abuses. 63 If the URNG
had not adamantly advocated the creation of a truth commission, the
military would have ensured the absence of such a commission from the
peace process.

ATRocrniEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBURO LEGACY 196 (1997).

57. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions and Amnesties in Latin America: The Second

Generation, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. 313, 316 (1998).
58. Id.
59. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597,639 (1994).
60. Oslo Agreement, supra note 3; see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 57, at 316.
61. Guatemalan Negotiator Says Human Rights Accord Near Signing, UPI, Mar. 23, 1994,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
62. Guatemalan Guerillas DemandSwifAccordon HumanRights in Talks, AGENCEFRANCE
PREssE, Mar. 4, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse.
63. George Lovell, Guatemala Facing a Decisive Test: Prospectsfor Peach in 30-Year Civil
War Hinge on President's Ability to Reduce the Army' s Authority, TORONTO STAR, May 31, 1994,
at A15.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss3/3
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As in many political compromises, a truth commission's mandate

usually reflects the balance of power among the respective parties." For
example, in El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation front
(FMLN) and the Salvadoran Army were mired in a military stalemate,

with each force controlling certain parts of the country.6" Having fought
against the FMLN for eleven years, the Salvadoran military was keenly
aware that the FMLN represented the "most effective guerilla force" in
Latin America."6 Furthermore, because the Salvadoran Army received
significant military aid from the United States, it was vulnerable to
pressure from the U.S. to negotiate with the guerillas. 67 The FMLN's
military prowess and international support allowed it to negotiate a
favorable peace settlement.68 Predictably, the mandate of the UN Truth
Commission for El Salvador reflects the bargaining power of the FMLN.
Most significantly, it does not include a provision against identifying
perpetrators and it calls for the commission to make binding
recommendations upon the Salvadoran government." Furthermore, in
addition to the notable characteristics of the Salvadoran Commission's
mandate, the FMLN also demonstrated its negotiating power by insisting
upon the creation of a separate commission to purge the Salvadoran
military of human rights violators.70 Had the FMLN not proved itself to be
a military equal of the Salvadoran Army, its chances of securing such a
favorable peace agreement would have been significantly diminished.
In contrast to the Salvadoran example, the Guatemalan Army held an
immensely stronger military position than the URNG. By the time the two
sides began to negotiate seriously, the Army had largely destroyed the
guerillas as a military force.7 ' Moreover, unlike the Salvadoran Army, the
military in Guatemala no longer received American funding, so U.S.
pressure, although influential, was not as persuasive as it had been upon
the Salvadoran military leadership. 2 While the Army eventually buckled
under international and domestic pressure and agreed to the establishment

64. See Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth ofTruth Commissions: Comparative
Lessonsfrom Haiti,South Africa,and Guatemala, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 1, 11-12 (2001).
65. Lovell, supra note 63, at AI5; Hayner, supra note 59, at 628.
66. Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions
in Latin America, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 79, 86 (1995).

67. The GuatemalanWill, INTERMTIONAL HERALD TRMUNE, Nov. 21, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France).
68. Popkin, supra note 66, at 87.
69. Thomas Buergenthal, The UnitedNations Truth CommissionforE Salvador,27 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 520, 533 (1994).
70. Popkin, supra note 66, at 87.
71. Larry Rohter, GuatemalansNegotiatingFutureRole ofMilitary, N. Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27,
1995, at 6.
72. The Guatemalan Will, supra note 67.
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of a truth commission, it did so reluctantly and ensured that the
Commission would not have a powerful mandate and would not be a tool
for individual accountability.
B. Relevant Terms and Omissions in the Mandate

Although observers viewed the establishment of a truth commission as
a victory for the militarily weak URNG, the terms of the Oslo Agreement
reflect the Army's pre-eminence at the negotiations. As Priscilla Hayner
explains in her survey of fifteen truth commissions, "[tihe most significant
limitations on truth commissions are those written into their mandates.""
In Guatemala, the military ensured that the drafters of the Oslo Agreement
included significant restrictions in the CEH's mandate.
The Oslo Agreement limited the CEH both by the Accord's terms and
its omissions. The terms of the Agreement gave the CEH an extremely
broad mandate and surprisingly little time in which to fulfill the mandate.74
Furthermore, the Agreement restricted the CEH from attributing
responsibility to individual perpetrators, and it clarified that the CEH's
report would not have any "judicial aim or effect."' Besides the
significant restrictions the Agreement placed upon the Commission, it also
severely limited the Commission's power by failing to provide the
Commission with certain capabilities. The Accord did not provide
authority for the Commission to grant amnesty or subpoena witnesses, and
it left the Commission without search and seizure powers or other effective
means of procuring evidence.7' If the URNG had occupied a stronger
military position or if the civil society in Guatemala had had the
opportunity for greater participation in the peace talks, it is unlikely that
these terms and omissions would have shaped the CEH's mandate.
The combination of a mandate extremely broad in scope and
insufficient time in which to fulfill that mandate placed severe restrictions
on the CEH. While those who support accountability for human rights
abuses would normally look favorably upon a truth commission with a
broad mandate to investigate past abuses, the scope of the CEH's mandate
was too broad. The Oslo Agreement, among other requirements, called for
the Commission to clarify "the human rights violations and acts of
violence that have caused the Guatemalan populations to suffer, connected
with the armed conflict."" By itself, the expectation that the CEH could
73. Hayner, supra note 59, at 636.
74. Oslo Agreement, supra note 3.
75. Id.
76. Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 9, 10; Richard Wilson, The Politics of Remembering and
Forgetting in Guatemala, in GUATEMALA AFTERTHE PEACEACCORDS 181, 184 (Rachel Siedered.,

1998).
77. Oslo Agreement supra note 3.
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have investigated and reported on all human rights violations and acts of
violence during almost four decades of war is preposterous.7 CEH
Coordinator Christian Tomuschat explains that from the very outset, this
provision overburdened the Commission, "preventing it from discharging
its mandate in a thorough fashion. " " The URNG advocated a more
practical mandate, which would have required the CEH to investigate and
report only upon human rights violations that occurred from 1980
onwards, the years in which the worst atrocities took place.'s In contrast,
the Guatemalan government and military "pushed for a time scale to
include the whole period of the armed conflict so as to overwhelm an
under-resourced investigation team, and this view won out."...
Adding to the impossibility of complying with the scope of the
mandate, the Oslo Agreement severely limited the CEH's lifespan. It
provided for the CEH to operate for only six months, allowing the
possibility of an additional six months upon the Commission's
determination.' While most truthcommissions do not last for long periods
of time, they also do not face the daunting task of clarifying all the
violations that occurred during thirty-six years of war. For example, the
Chilean and Salvadoran truth commissions, which only investigated
certain types of violations or acts of violence, operated for eight and nine
months respectively. 3 These Commissions investigated atrocities that
occurred during an eleven year civil war (El Salvador) and a sixteen year
dictatorship (Chile), both less than half as long as the armed conflict in
Guatemala; however, they had almost as much time as the CEH originally
had to complete their tasks.' It is no wonder that Coordinator Tomuschat
claims that "[a]n almost incomprehensible contradiction lay in the
exigency that 'all' human rights violations and acts of violence were to be
investigated within a period as short as six months.""' The broad scope and
insufficient duration of the CEH's mandate were consistent with the
military's goal of creating a weak commission.
The Oslo Agreement's prohibition against assigning individual
responsibility for human rights abuses is the most obvious manifestation
of the military's desire to limit the scope of the CEH. This provision,
78. Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 5.
79. Id.

80. Wilson, supra note 76, at 184.
81. Id.
82. Oslo Agreement, supra note 3.
83. Marta Altolaguirre, Alcances y limitacionesde la Comisidn para el Esclarecimiento
Historicode las Violaciones a los Derechos Humanosy los Hechos de Violencia que han Causado
Sufrimiento a la Poblacidn Guatemalteca, in GUATEMALA AFTER THE PEACE ACCORDS 153, 157
(Rachel Sieder ed., 1998).
84. Id.
85. Tomushcat, supra note 24, at 6.
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which also states that the CEH's report will not have "any judicial aim or
effect," severely restricted the Commission as a vehicle for individual
accountability.'M By not allowing the CEH to identify perpetrators, the
drafters of the Agreement ensured continued impunity for wartime human
rights violations.
The omissions in the Oslo Agreement further confined the
Commission. For example, unlike the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 7 the CEH lacked both the power to subpoena
witnesses and the capability to grant amnesty to perpetrators who
confessed their violations." This meant that the CEH could neither compel
witnesses to testify, nor offer witnesses an incentive for their cooperation
and testimony. Without the powers to subpoena or grant amnesty, the
Commission did not have access to those who knew the most about the

human rights violations - the perpetrators themselves and the intellectual
authors of the crimes.
In addition to the Commission's inability to compel or entice the
perpetrators to testify, it lacked power to procure evidence about the
atrocities under investigation. The CEH, unlike the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, did not have the capability to
search for or seize pertinent documents; nor did it have sufficient access
to government and military archives." This inherent weakness made it
possible for the Guatemalan government, military, and State security
apparatus to engage in a "deliberate strategy of obstruction" with regard
to the investigation." With a choice between voluntarily providing

inculpatory documents or refusing to cooperate with the CEH's
investigation, members of the military and State security apparatus

predictably chose the latter option.
C. Reactions to the Oslo Agreement

Reactions to the Oslo Agreement varied greatly depending upon the
person or group's preference for or against holding the perpetrators
86. The Oslo Agreement states, "The Commission shall not attribute responsibility to any
individual in its work, recommendations and report nor shall these have any judicial aim or effect."
Oslo Agreement, supra note 3.
87. See Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliationor Justice andAshes: Amnesty Commissions
and the Duty to Punish Human Rights QOnses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 18,19 (1999); Chapman,
supra note 64, at 15.
88. Truth Commission Begins Its Work- Ten Months to Establish What HappenedOver 36
Years, LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, Aug.

19, 1997, at 2.
89. Dan Markel, The Justice ofAmnesty?, Towards a Theory ofRetributivism in Recovering
States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 397, 398 (1999).
90. Wilson, note 74, at 184; Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 13.
91. Tomuschat, supranote 24, at 12.
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accountable for their actions. Civil society inside Guatemala and many
international observers harshly criticized the Commission's mandate. 91
They predicted that the CEH's report would merely reiterate what
everyone already knew - that the State committed heinous atrocities
during the war.93 Some went as far as asking why even have a truth
commission "[g]iven that the Accord creates a truth commission with no
legal powers to investigate, which cannot name names and which will
produce recommendations which can be utterly ignored"?94 The
Agreement so enraged a group of Guatemalan bishops that they decided
to set up the Recovery of Historical Memory project (REHMI), a truth
commission run by the Catholic Church.95 The Oslo Agreement bitterly
disappointed many people who originally strongly supported the creation
of a truth commission.
Ironically, those in the military and government who vehemently
opposed the creation of a truth commission praised the Oslo Agreement.
"[T]here was huge relief and celebration on the part of army commanders
...

'who were happy that there will not be any legal dimensions to the

Commission."' Even then President of Guatemala, Ramiro de Leon
Carpio reassured the military that they succeeded in creating a commission
that could not individualize responsibility and could not make binding
recommendations.97 This rejoicing demonstrates the extent to which those
opposing accountability for past abuses shaped the CEH's mandate.
Although less than the military, the URNG also benefited from the
Oslo Agreement. The guerilla group received credit for insisting on the
creation of a truth commission as a prerequisite for any final peace
agreement. Furthermore, since the URNG was planning to demobilize and
re-enter civil society as a political party, the leadership cadre benefited
from the CEH's inability to name individual perpetrators.98 Although it is
easy to do so, one must not forget that the URNG, in addition to the
Guatemalan military, committed human rights abuses during the war. Had
the CEH named names, it might have damaged the budding political
careers of former guerilla leaders. 99
92. Chapman, supra note 64, at 13.
93. Celina Zubieta, Guatemala-Human Rights: Commission Has No Teeth, Critics Charge,

INTER PRESS SERvicE, Feb. 25, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service.
94. Wilson, supra note 76, at 185.
95. Id at 189.
96. Id. at 188.
97. President Welcomes Agreement with URNG on Forming a Truth Commission, BBC

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 27, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts; Oslo Agreement on 'Truth Commission': Findings Won't Be Binding; Culprits
Won't Be Tried, LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, July 7, 1994, at 299.
98. Guatemala: Unchecked Crime Undermines Peace Process, supra note 49.

99. For a discussion of the URNG's transition from a guerilla movement to a political party,
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V. NAMING NAMEs
A. A Lost Opportunityfor IndividualAccountability
Many of the critics of the Oslo Agreement changed their rhetoric from
criticism to praise when the CEH presented Memory of Silence. The
Commission, that they once characterized as having "no teeth,"'' °
condemned the government and military of Guatemala for its tactics of
repression and human rights violations. It unexpectedly found the State
responsible for committing genocide during several years of the war.'°'
Regardless of the praise the report received, the reality of the CEH's
inability to significantly advance the goal of individual accountability

remains. Therefore, one must examine the Commission's decision against
identifying individual perpetrators, in light ofits mandate, and ask whether
or not it erred in making this decision.
Some human rights organizations encouraged the CEH to name names
of perpetrators in its final report. These groups creatively vented their
frustration with the Oslo Agreement's prohibition against assigning
individual responsibility. They advocated a "strict construction" of the
provision, which would have allowed the CEH to interpret the
individualization of responsibility as requiring a legal assessment." 2 Had
the Commission adopted this interpretation, it could have included the
names of perpetrators in purely factual accounts of the violations that
occurred.'13 The human rights NGOs argued that, if the CEH adopted their
interpretation, naming names in a factual account would not equal a
judicial determination of guilt; and, therefore, it would not violate the
prohibition against assigning individual responsibility."' 4
Those in favor of naming names proposed persuasive arguments that
the Commission should have adopted the human rights organizations'
interpretation of the Oslo Agreement and named names in its final report.
The future of democracy and the rule of law in Guatemala, as well as
respect for the legal and moral rights of the victims and their families,
require holding perpetrators accountable for their abuses. Accountability,

see Anna Vinegrad, From Guerrillas to Politicians: The Transition of the Guatemalan
Revolutionary Movement in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in GUATEMALA AFTER THE
PEAcE ACCORDS 207 (Rachel Sieder ed., 1998).

100.
101.
Feb. 26,
102.
103.
104.

Zubieta, supra note 93.
MireyaNavarro, GuatemalanArmy Waged "Genocide, "New ReportFinds,N.Y. TIMES,
1999, at Al.
Tomuschat, supranote 24, at 8.
Id
Id.
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in turn, probably depended upon the CEH having identified the
perpetrators in its report.
1. Deterrence of Similar Crimes
Many observers consider impunity to be the greatest obstacle facing
Guatemala as it moves from armed conflict towards democracy and the
rule of law."'0 Failure to make accountability a priority "seriously weakens
subsequent efforts to reform such crucial institutions as the police and the
judiciary."" °6 It does so by eliminating one of the principal purposes of
accountability - deterrence. Identifying perpetrators, even without
lustration or prosecution, can achieve a significant degree of deterrence. "
"Specific deterrence refers to inhibiting the previous offender from again
committing similar crimes.""' 8 By naming names, the CEH would have
placed perpetrators under intense public scrutiny. Therefore, even if they
remained in the government or military, their future behavior and
compliance with the law would become a matter of public concern, which
could serve as an effective deterrent against criminal behavior.
Specific deterrence is essential in the case of Guatemala since the
perpetrators of wartime human rights violations occupy many positions on
all levels of the Guatemalan government and military. General Efiain Rios
Montt's return to Guatemalan politics clearly demonstrates the rampant
impunity for wartime human rights abuses and the need for specific
deterrence of perpetrators. Rios Montt was President of Guatemala from
June 1982 to August 1983, the time period in which the Guatemalan State
committed acts of genocide."° Although human rights groups have long
blamed Rios Montt for orchestrating the worst of the wartime atrocities,
the Guatemalan government has not attempted to prosecute him. 0
Taking full advantage of the atmosphere of impunity in Guatemala,
Rios Montt has become a force in national politics. He founded and
remains the leader of the right-wing Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG),
the political party whose candidates won the presidency and the majority

105. LauraN. O'Shaughnessy, Commentary, Despite China's Meddling,GuatemalaMay Give

Peacea Chance,Cm. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1997, at N13.

106. Id.
107. See Joe M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth andNothingButthe Truth: Truth Commissions,

Impunity andthe Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 321, 351-52 (1994).
108. Id.
109. MEMORY OF SILENCE, supra note 4, at 80.
110. Report Unveils Pattern ofGenocide; Big Question is Whether Culprits Will Face Trial,
LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, Mar. 2,1999, at 98. Members of several Mayan communities
recently filed suit in Guatemala against Rios Montt, accusing him of presiding over the genocide
perpetrated against Mayan groups during the civil war. T. Christian Miller, Guatemalansto Sue Top
Lawmaker Over Genocide, L.A. TIMES, June 6,2001, at AI.
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of congressional seats in the first elections held since the end ofthe war.III
In the November 1999 elections, Rios Montt won a seat in Congress and
now serves as the President of the Congress of Guatemala." 2 Even though
the CEH assigned responsibility for the genocide and gross human rights

violations to the highest levels of the Guatemalan government, Rios Montt
denies all allegations against him and remains free from any serious threat
of prosecution by the Guatemalan government."' Had the Commission
named names, it could have placed Rios Montt under intense scrutiny,
which arguably could help deter him from committing atrocities in the
future.

In addition to specific deterrence, general deterrence is equally
necessary to prevent future human rights abuses. "General deterrence
refers to inhibiting others from committing similar crimes" to those
committed by the named perpetrators. 114 The impunity that permeated

Guatemala during several decades of civil war set the unfortunate
precedent that one could commit heinous crimes and never be held
accountable. Identifying perpetrators can help reverse this precedent,
demonstrating that both criminals and intellectual authors ofcertain crimes
cannot keep their identities secret. The fear of public exposure would deter
the commission of future abuses.
2. Transition to Democracy and Closure for Victims
In addition to deterring future atrocities, identifying perpetrators may
enhance the transition to democracy and the rule of law by infusing a sense
of justice into a victimized population. While the mere identification of

I 11.Lorena Prez, Politics-Guatemala:FirstGeneralElections Since Peace Accord, INTER
PREss SERVICE, Nov. 4, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inter Press Service; Portillo Sworn in as
President,FACTS ON FI.E WORLD NEWS DIoEsT, Feb. 3,2000, at 68, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts
on File World News Digest; The Boggy Roadto Peace, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24,2001, available
at 2001 WL 7317746.
112. PortilloSworn in as President,supranote 107. Rios Montt's presence continues to be
a destabilizing force in Guatemalan politics. The Constitutional Court recently stripped him and
five other FRG congressmen of their immunity because of their alleged involvement in the
fraudulent alteration of a congressional act. Although immunity is a prerequisite for serving in
Congress, Rios Montt refused "to step down despite the court's ruling." On April 24,2001, ajudge
dismissed the charges against the ex-dictator in a decision that civic groups consider to be a
"national embarrassment." Several groups, including Movement for Justice and Democracy, plan
to appeal the judge's decision. Oscar Rene Oliva, Guatemala-CongressRios Montt, Constitutional
Court Face Offin Guatemala, EFE NEws SERVICE, Mar. 23, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Global
News Wire on April 24,2001; GuatemalanJudge DismissesCaseAgainst Ex-DictatorRios Montt,
Apr. 25, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse at the time of publishing.
113. Guatemala:PendingJustice, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1999, at 46, availableat 1999
WL 7362064.
114. Pasqualucci, supranote 107, at 351-52.
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perpetrators in a truth commission report does not have an effect equally
as powerful as criminal prosecutions, this form of accountability may

provide the only possibility for justice."' Indeed, Thomas Buergenthal,
one of the Commissioners on the UN Truth Commission for El Salvador,
explains that the Salvadoran Commission premised its decision to name
names.on the knowledge that the "Salvadoran justice system was corrupt,
ineffective, and incapable of rendering impartial judgments in so-called
'political' cases."" '

The CEH's decision not to identify perpetrators assumes added
significance in light of the lack of potential for meaningful prosecution in
Guatemala. Instead of naming names, the Commission recommends
prosecution of the crimes "for whose commission liability is not
extinguished" by the National Reconciliation Law."' This strategy is risky
for any truth-telling body because prosecutions after a truth commission
publishes its report are extremely rare."' One can argue that the strategy

was particularly misguided in the Guatemalan context, considering the
obvious inability of the Guatemalan courts to provide a legitimate forum
for confronting perpetrators. More than two years had passed between the

signing of the Peace Accords and the publishing of the CEH's report,
giving the Commission ample opportunity to note the dismal state of the
judicial system and the near certainty that impunity would remain the

norm in Guatemala. Even with its awareness of this situation and the
knowledge that identifying perpetrators could partially accomplish some
of the goals of prosecution, the CEH opted against naming names." 9
This decision had dire consequences for Guatemala. It deprived
Guatemalans of a desperately needed opportunity for "self-scrutiny.' ' 0
Had the CEH named names, Guatemalans could have decided whether to
allow those named to continue to occupy positions in State institutions and
remain upstanding members of their respective communities. Just as
naming names forces perpetrators "to face their societies and their
victims," it also gives whole societies an opportunity to scrutinize
themselves.' 2 ' Throughout this process, political futures and personal
reputations can be altered.'" The political resurgence of General Rios
Montt, suspected author of the State's policy of genocide and current
115. Id

116. Buergenthal, supra note 69, at 522.
117. MEMORY oF SELEICE, supra note 4, at 58; see generally Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra
note 34 (explaining the National Reconciliation Law).
118. Hayner, supra note 59, at 604.
119. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
120. Francisco Goldman, In Guatemala A Ii Is Forgotten,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, atAl 5.
121. Id.
122. Id
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

19

JOURNAL OFLaw,
INTERNATONAL
LAW
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 13, Iss.
3 [2001], Art. 3

[Vol. 13

President of the Guatemalan Congress, demonstrates the consequences of
Guatemala's missed opportunity for self-scrutiny.
Switching from a societal-based perspective to a victim-centered
perspective exposes further ramifications of the decision not to identify
perpetrators in Memory ofSilence. First, some scholars argue that one can
interpret international law to require states to publicly disclose
perpetrators' identities."n Based on this interpretation and the
improbability of the Guatemalan government's compliance with this
obligation, one can argue that CEH had a legal duty to name names. Aside
from the possible legal "right to know," victims of human rights abuses
and their families have a moral right to information such as the identity of
the person who committed the crime. After all, "[p]unishment of the
violator may be an essential element of an effective remedy for the
' Although mere knowledge of the
victim."124
perpetrator's identity might
not satisfy the victim's desire for retribution to the same extent as a guilty
verdict and jail sentence, it can help the victim obtain closure. As one
Guatemalan mother lamented, '[t]he assassins are alive, with their
families, and I lost two children. I want to know the face of the
assassins."' 15 Out of respect for the thousands of victims, many people
claim that the CEH should have named names.
Finally, human rights advocates simply argue that, although not ideal,
identifying perpetrators in the CEH's report would have been the best
alternative. Since the CEH was not a judicial body, the naming of
perpetrators would not have resulted in their loss of liberty.'2 6
Furthermore, since the Commission could only make non-binding

recommendations, had it named certain perpetrators and recommended
their removal from positions of power, it could not have compelled the
State or the URNG to comply with the recommendations. While less

preferable than criminal prosecution, the Commission's report could have
represented the only viable option for individual accountability in
Guatemala.
B. Justifying the Decision Not to Name Names
Despite the existence of strong arguments in favor of naming names,
the CEH wisely decided against imposing this form of individual
accountability. Initially, one must understand that the duty of states to
identify and hold perpetrators accountable does not necessarily apply to

123.
124.
125.
AI0.
126.

Pasqualucci, supra note 107, at 331-32.
Id. at 355.
Mireya Navarro, Pain of Warfor GuatemalansIsn't Over, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at
See RATNER, supranote 56,at 198.
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truth commissions. Furthermore, truth commissions in general, and the
CEH specifically, are poor mechanisms ,for holding individuals
accountable for human rights violations. Had the Commission identified
perpetrators, it would have acted beyond its practical capabilities and
would have risked violating the due process rights of the people named in
the report. Finally, in the specific case of the CEH, identifying perpetrators
would have constituted an ultra vires act of the Commission. Such action
would have had the potential to seriously undermine the credibility of the
CEH and its report, as well as MINUGUA" 7 and subsequent UN peace
mediation efforts.
1. The Duty of Accountability and Its Application to the CEH
While human rights scholars do not necessarily agree on the extent to
which states must hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, most
scholars argue that current international law has created a duty of
accountability for states.2 8 Increasingly, "international law requires states

to punish certain crimes committed in their territorial jurisdiction."'2 This
requirement stems from the terms of human rights treaties, such as the
Genocide and Torture Conventions, authoritative interpretations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights, as well as customary international law. "0
Although, in many instances states must comply with the requirements
of international law regarding the punishment of perpetrators, this
obligation does not necessarily pertain to truth commissions. One may
argue that international law requires certain types of truth commissions to
name names as part of the state's duty to identify and.punish perpetrators.
For example, a state-run truth commission in a country that has signed the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) could face some of the
same obligations under the ACHR as those that the state, itself, faces. In
its 1988 Velasquez-Rodriguez decision, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights interpreted the ACHR to require state parties to ensure the
substantive rights in the Convention. 3' Among other obligations, the Court

127. MINUGUA is the UN mission for the verification of human ights in Guatemala. See
Minugua, Mision de Verificion de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala, at
http://www.minugua.guate.net (last visited May 5,2001).
128. Orentlichersupra note 119, at 2551.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2551-552, 2564,2566,2568,2576-577,2582; see generallyNaomi Roht-Arriaza,
Sources in InternationalTreaties ofan Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute and Provide Re&ess

in IMPUNrrY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 24 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza
ed., 1995).
131. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 130, at 30.
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found the Convention to obligate states
to identify perpetrators and
132
"impose the appropriate punishment."
Under Velasquez-Rodriguez, the ACHR may require a state-run truth
commission, investigating human rights abuses that occurred within a
jurisdiction bound by the ACHR, to name names. This obligation would
be most obvious in situations in which the members of the truth
commission believed that the state lacked either or both the capability and
will to prosecute perpetrators. In such situations, naming names would
allow the truth commission to fulfill the state's obligation to identify
perpetrators; and, it would allow partial fulfillment of the state's obligation
to punish perpetrators, based on the negative consequences that could
befall those people named in the report.
In the case of Guatemala, however, neither the duties stemming from
Velasquez-Rodriguez, nor those originating in international treaties or
customary law binding upon the State of Guatemala apply to the CEH.
These duties apply to states and,,arguably, to state-run truth commissions.
Although the State of Guatemala contributed money to the Commission,
the CEH was a neutral, independent entity.'33 Since the CEH did not act on
behalf of the State, one cannot argue that it bore the responsibility of
fulfilling the State's obligations under international law.1 34 While one
might still argue that the CEH had a moral duty to name names, especially
considering the members' acute awareness of the impunity that plagues
Guatemala, the independence of the Commission from the State of
Guatemala also entailed independence from the State's legal duties.
2. Truth Commissions: Poor Vehicles for Individual Accountability
Regardless of the existence of a duty of accountability under
international law, truth commissions, by nature, are poor vehicles for
individual accountability. Their main utility revolves around providing a
neutral, accurate, and timely accounting of the facts that led to the
outbreak of violence in a specific conflict and of the nature of the violence.
"The goal of any truth commission should be to establish the overall
35
picture of political violence during the period specified" in its mandate.1
In light of this goal, sponsoring entities create truth-telling bodies with
short life spans and relatively few procedural safeguards. Because the

132. Velasquez-Rodriguez case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 4(1988), Judgement ofJuly29, 1988,
para. 174, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_lI 112d.htm (last visited May 9,
2001); see also Roht-Arriaza, supranote 130, at 30.
133. MEMORY OFS.LENCE, supranote 4, Acknowledgements.
134. '"he Commission has no responsibility vis-t-vis the Government or the Congress of
Guatemala." See Between National and InternationalLaw, supra note 4, at 1007.
135. Hayner, supra note 59, at 653.
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CEH shared these general characteristics of truth commission, it wisely
decided against naming names.
Attempting to identify individual perpetrators would have significantly
increased the burden on the Commission. Naming names potentially
"exposes the accused to public condemnation, perception of guilt, and
possibly even security risks";' 36 therefore, because of due process
concerns, if a panel intends to identify perpetrators its proceedings should
resemble judicial proceedings. 37 It should allow or provide the accused
legal representation, explain the accusations against the accused, and give
him an opportunity
to confront witnesses and defend himself against the
38
accusations.
In addition to the prohibition against assigning individual responsibility
in the Oslo Agreement, several other terms in the CEH's mandate militated
against naming names by limiting the CEH's ability to ensure due process.
First, the procedural safeguards that ensure fairness and accuracy require
significant amounts of time and resources, both of which the CEH
lacked. 3' Even without identifying individual perpetrators, the
Commission had a daunting task. With only one year to determine the
roots of conflict in a complex society, investigate thirty-six years of
atrocities, and recommend steps to avoid the recurrence of those atrocities,
the CEH had an overwhelming mandate." Fulfilling this mandate within
the one year originally allotted to the CEH proved impossible, as
evidenced by the eighteen months that the Commission ultimately needed
to complete and publish its report.' 4' Furthermore, financial constraints
posed a serious threat to the Commission. 42 Coordinator Tomuschat
explains that the CEH was "under the threat of financial collapse"
throughout its existence. 41 3 Considering the financial and time constraints
imposed upon the Commission by the Oslo Agreement, providing
adequate procedural safeguards would have been extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
Besides the problematic issues of time and money, the nature of the
CEH's proceedings, as set out by the Oslo Agreement, further limited the
CEH's ability to provide due process guarantees for those perpetrators that

136. RATNER, supra note 56, at 198.
137. Id. at 201-02.

138. Id. at 202.
139. See Tomushcat, supra note 24, at 6, 11.
140. See Chapman, supra note 64, at 7, 8.

141. Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 6; Guatemalan Government Embarrassed by "Truth
Commission" Proposals, in LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL
AMERICA REPORT, Mar. 30, 1999, at 1.

142. Tomuschat, supranote 24, at 11; see also Between Nationaland InternationalLaw, supra
note 4, at 1004-1005.
143. Id.
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the Commission could have named. The Oslo Agreement states that "[t]he
Commission's proceedings shall be confidential so as to guarantee the

secrecy of the sources and the safety of informants.'" Without this
provision witnesses and informants would have been justifiably reluctant
to provide information to the CEH. Even after the war ended, Guatemalans
still feared that "the former power wielders ..
would take revenge
measures against
any
witnesses
daring
to
talk
about
the
injustices they had
145
suffered.'

While this provision aided the Commission significantly in its daunting
task of gathering information on the thousands of atrocities that had
occurred, it also would have prevented the CEH from ensuring a central
tenet ofdue process - allowing the accused to confront his or her accuser.
Similarly constrained, the UN Truth Commission for El Salvador
manoeuvred around this impediment to due process by only naming names
of individuals against whom charges were "substantiated by overwhelming
or substantial evidence."'"
Although unclear whether or not this self-imposed evidentiary standard
provides an equivalent to the due process right of confronting an accuser,
the situation in Guatemala posed challenges to the CEH that the
Salvadoran Commission did not face. For example, whereas the
Salvadoran civil war lasted eleven years, 47 the Guatemalan civil war
dragged on for over three and one half decades. Not surprisingly, the
Salvadoran Commission registered over 22,000 cases, barely half of the
number of cases that the CEH registered."4 Furthermore, the Salvadoran
Commission's mandate was significantly narrower than that of the CEH.
The result of this difference was that the Salvadoran Commission reported
findings on only thirty-three of the 22,000 cases brought to its attention. 49
The CEH, on the other hand, published a 3,500 page report describing
atrocities committed against thousands of Guatemalans.
The significant differences between the mandates of the two
commissions and the number of cases reported are particularly relevant in
the context of due process. The Salvadoran Commission registered fewer
cases than the CEH, and could fulfill its mandate by reporting on only
thirty-three of the cases it registered; therefore, it had the luxury to spend
more time "verifying, substantiating and reviewing" the evidence
presented to it, in an effort to ensure evidentiary reliability and accurate

144.
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146.
147.
148.
16 HuM.
149.

Oslo Agreeanent, supra note 3.
Tomuschat, supra note 24, at 10.
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documentation of atrocities." Considering the immensely larger task
undertaken by the CEH, meeting an evidentiary standard sufficient to allay
due process concerns of named perpetrators would have significantly
increased the burden on the Commission.
Moreover, the thirty-six year time period that the CEH investigated
raises due process concerns in a manner more pressing than does the
eleven year time period that the Salvadoran Commission investigated.
With the passage of time, witness' memories fade and become less
reliable, and charges of crimes become increasingly difficult to verify.'
Had the CEH decided to name names, these phenomena would have posed
serious due process concerns. The Commission would have been
investigating atrocities and trying to establish guilt for crimes committed
over three and a half decades before the Commission's existence and
genocide committed almost two decades before the Commission began
work. This time factor suggests that any identification of individual
perpetrators would have been unjust unless it met the strictest procedural
safeguards. Since several provisions in the Oslo Agreement, as well as
factors relating to the Guatemalan civil war, would have prevented the
CEH from meeting due process requirements, the CEH wisely decided
against naming names.

3. Avoiding Illegitimate Action
Even in the unlikely scenario that the CEH could have implemented
procedures sufficient to ensure due process, naming names would have
constituted an ultra vires act on behalf of the Commission. As discussed
above, "[t]he most significant limitations on truth commissions are those
written into their mandates.""' The mandate sets forth the commission's
"goals, powers, and procedures."' 53 Like other bodies that derive their
purposes and powers from charters, truth commissions have the power to
interpret the terms of their mandates; however, this power of interpretation
is not as great as that of a permanent, charter-created body such as the
United Nations.
Because the UN is an enduring institution, its various organs are
constantly interpreting the UN Charter. Since the Charter has "formally
remained almost unchanged as a legal basis for the acts of its organs...
and its member states for more than 45 years now, the need arises for
adapting the Charter to the changing tasks by way of an evolutionary

150. Buergenthal, supra note 69, at 511-12.
151. Chapman& Ball, supra note 64, at 5,6.
152. Hayner, supra note 59, at 636.
153. RATNER & ABRAM supra note 56,at 196.
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dynamic interpretation."''" Over time and in light of and response to
changing conditions throughout the world, it is only natural that
interpretations of the UN charter shift, to a certain degree, away from the
framers' original intent. The changing conditions and passage of time that
make evolutionary interpretation of the Charter necessary also affect the
specific "language and meaning of words" in the constituent instrument.'"
Thus, the answer to a question concerning the meaning of a
word may differ, depending on whether the answer is based
on the meaning of the term at the time of the conclusion of
the treaty (static-subjective interpretation based on the
original will of the parties) or on the linguistic usage of the
term at the time of interpretation (dynamic-evolutionary,
objective interpretation).
If those involved in the interpretation of the Charter refrained from using
a "dynamic-evolutionary" method of interpretation, it would hamper the
UN's ability to adapt to new situations and the Organization's
effectiveness would quickly decline.
In contrast to its value for interpreting the constituent instruments
of long-lasting international organizations, evolutionary interpretation is
less appropriate in interpreting and applying the mandates of truth-telling
bodies. Unlike organizations such as the UN, most truth commissions have
mandates that limit their existence to two years or less. Because of the
usual brief duration of truth commissions, these bodies do not have to
adapt to changing conditions to the same extent as enduring international
organizations. Since they do not face the same complexities that arise from
interpretation of a constituent instrument written many years prior to the
date of interpretation, they have less need to use an evolutionary
interpretative method. Members of truth commissions are empowered to
interpret the commissions' mandates and are not mere mouthpieces for the
parties that created the commissions. They do not have to rigidly adhere
to the specific will of the parties on each and every issue in question.
However, because of the short duration of most truth commissions, the
necessity for broad interpretative powers is non-existent. Without the need
for broad interpretative powers, members of a commission should not
usurp them; doing so can lead to ultra vires action on behalf of a truth
commission.
Since the Oslo Agreement only provided for the Commission to
exist for, at most, one year, the members of the CEH had neither the need

154. BRUNO SIMMA,
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nor the justification to adopt an evolutionary interpretative approach to the
Agreement. 157 Sufficient time had not passed for changes in language or
external conditions to affect the meaning of the provisions in the CEH's
mandate.
Instead of the evolutionary method, the CEH and other truth
commissions facing interpretative difficulties should look to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and fundamental tenets of
treaty law and general law. The interpretation of a charter or mandate
created by a treaty differs in certain aspects from normal treaty
interpretation. Despite these differences, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and certain tenets of general law and treaty interpretation
still apply to charter or mandate interpretation. 5 For example, Article
3 1(1) of the VCLT requires "that treaty provisions are to be interpreted 'in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty."" 15 9 "A special meaning may only be given to a term... if the
parties intended to do so at the time" the treaty was made."' Furthermore,
the bona fides rule, a general principle of law, calls for "interpretation
according to the principles of good faith."'' This rule obliges a "nonarbitrary interpretation of treaties and forbids deviation from its 'true'
substantial meaning."""
Applying Article 31 (1) of the VCLT and the bonafides
rule to the
CEH's decision against naming names demonstrates that the Commission
acted appropriately. The Oslo Agreement specifically states that the
Commission's work "shall not attribute responsibility to any individual." 63
With sufficient imagination, one could create myriad interpretations of this
provision. In contrast, if one looks to Article 3 1(1) for guidance in
interpreting the provision, the meaning becomes relatively clear. Since
naming names is an obvious form of assigning individual responsibility,
an unbiased reader, no doubt, would interpret the term to forbid the
Commission from naming names. Devising any interpretation that would
have allowed the CEH to identify individual perpetrators would have
entailed giving the term a special meaning contradictory to the parties'
intent at the time of the Oslo Agreement. As discussed earlier, the
Guatemalan State's dominance on the battlefield led to dominance at the
negotiating table. The Army never would have accepted the creation of a

157. Oslo Agreement, supra note 3.
158. SIMMA, supranote 154, at31.
159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; SIMMA,
supra note 154, at 31.
160. SIMMA, supra note 154, at 3 1.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Oslo Agreement, supra note 3.
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truth-telling body that named names, and it successfully insisted that the
CEH did not have the power to do so.'" If the Commission had adopted
an interpretation of this controversial provision that allowed it to name
names, it would have flouted both the plain meaning of its mandate and the
intent of the drafters of the Oslo Agreement.
Adopting an illegitimate interpretation of the mandate and,
accordingly, acting ultra vires would have had severe ramifications. First,
it would have damaged the CEH's credibility and its appearance of
neutrality which, in turn, would have undermined the legitimacy of its
report. An impartial accounting of the violations that occurred is one of the
central purposes of all truth commissions, including the CEH. 65 Arguably,
such an accounting can help both victims and perpetrators move beyond
the bitter division of the war years and begin to create a more peaceful,
democratic society. A decision to identify perpetrators in Memory of
Silence would have undermined this goal. Instead of the report helping to
heal past divides, it would have only exacerbated those already there. The
Guatemalan government and military immediately would have protested
the report. They would have accused the Commissioners of violating the
terms of the Oslo Agreement and catering to the wishes of human rights
NGOs. They would have claimed that, considering the influence that those
organizations had upon the Commission's work, all the CEH's conclusions
were suspect. In turn, victims and their family members would have
become embittered once again, having lost the opportunity for an
officially-sanctioned body to legitimately inform the world of their
tremendous suffering. Whether the State would have lodged well-founded
protests or grossly exaggerated accusations is irrelevant. In either case, the
result would have compromised the legitimacy of the CEH and Memory
of Silence and frustrated the goal of reconciliation.
Besides compromising the CEH's credibility, a decision to identify
perpetrators would have also jeopardized the role of both MINUGUA, the
UN mission for the verification of human rights in Guatemala, and that of
the UN in negotiating peace settlements elsewhere in the world. Although

an independent entity, the CEH originated from a UN-sponsored
agreement and it enjoyed financial and logistical support from the UN.'"
The UN was an official recipient of the report and paid to publish it. 67
the CEH and
Despite its official independence, the connections between
6
the UN create the impression of a quasi-affiliation.' 1
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Therefore, the resentment that naming names would have caused
could easily have become general resentment of MINUGUA. The role of
MINUGUA is central to the peace process. It investigates and reports upon
human rights violations, and monitors the government's compliance with
the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights that both the State and
URNG signed during the peace process.'" The continued efficacy of
MINUGUA depends upon cooperation from its host, the Guatemalan
government. Ifthe government refused to cooperate or, even worse, forced
MINUGUA to abandon its mission, it would be a tremendous setback to
the peace process.
The negative effect of a decision to name names could also have
damaged the UN's reputation and ability as a peacemaker. Members of
other governments and militaries are not oblivious to events outside their
countries. For example, Guatemalan generals likely noted and learned
from events in El Salvador, where a truth commission identified over forty
perpetrators who had committed human rights violations." 0 To avoid this
type of accountability, the Guatemalan military insisted that the CEH not
have the power to identify individual perpetrators.
Just as Guatemalan generals learned from the Salvadoran example,
government and military leaders in other war-torn countries will learn
from the Guatemalan peace process. If the Commission, established during
a UN-brokered peace process, had ignored its mandate and named names,
it would make a strong, negative impression upon any leader trying to
avoid accountability. He or she would be less trusting of the UN and less
willing to cooperate for peace. Although individual accountability should
remain the preferred response to human rights abuses, an end to hostilities
is usually a prerequisite to reaching this goal. If the Guatemalan example
had made leaders more recalcitrant, it would have thwarted efforts for both
peace and individual accountability.

169. See Minugua, Mision de Verificion de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala, (explaining
how Minugua operates), at http'/www.minugua.guate.net/ (last visited May 5,2001); see Mission
for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the
Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala, GA. Res. 48/267, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess.,
U.N.
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(1994)
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VI. CONCLUSION

In making the inevitably controversial decision over whether to
name names in its final report, the CEH correctly opted against doing so.
This decision prevented the CEH from acting outside the scope of its
mandate and from violating the due process rights of potentially identified
perpetrators. Although legally and technically justified, the decision
limited the Commission's ability to serve as a vehicle for individual
accountability for human rights violations.
Legal scholars and human rights activists will continue to analyze
the Oslo Agreement, the CEH, and the decision not to identify individual
perpetrators. While further analysis can help members of future truth
commissions make similarly difficult decisions, for Guatemala, one must
ask, "What nextT'
In answering this question, it is useful to consider Guatemala's
recovery from its history of human rights abuses in the context of two
phases: the truth phase and the justice phase.""' The public presentation of
Memory of Silence constituted the crowning achievement of the truth
phase. The Commission assessed and documented a previously hidden and
obscure past of human rights violations and genocide." T Its report will

serve as a lasting testimony to the atrocities that occurred during the
Guatemalan civil war, and its recommendations will hopefully help

prevent future violations from occurring.
Although the truth phase plays a significant role in the initial stages
of a society's transition from a state of impunity and lack of respect for
human rights to a state in which human rights are valued and honored, this
phase is insufficient by itself. The truth, without more, does not satisfy the
goals of retribution against individual perpetrators or deterrence of future
crimes; and, in many cases it will not suffice to create a sense of closure
for victims.
Ideally, the justice phase would occur immediately after (or
possibly simultaneously with) the truth phase. The fact-finding and

documentation in the truth phase can serve as a valuable precursor to the

justice phase.' " The justice phase, in its most robust form, entails

investigation and prosecution of individual perpetrators and redress for

victims and their families. 74 More realistically, however, the truth phase

often represents both the beginning and end of a society's attempt to
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grapple with a history of human rights abuses. While a truth commission
report should facilitate the initiation of the justice phase, "in practice,
many states treat truth commissions as a substitute to prosecution."'"
Unfortunately, Guatemala seems prepared to continue the trend of
halting the recovery process after the completion of the truth phase. As
discussed above, perpetrators of wartime abuses still enjoy widespread
impunity. Those prosecutions that have occurred were usually against lowlevel, former PAC members, which raises issues of scapegoating and
selective prosecution. The criminal justice system suffers from corruption,
inefficiency, lack of sufficient financial resources, and susceptibility to
threats, intimidation, and violence.
Admittedly, the possibility of holding perpetrators accountable for
their human rights violations seems remote in Guatemala; however, the
international community should receive partial blame for this reality. The
UN, EU and several nations encouraged the creation and work of the CEH
and cooperated in funding the Commission. Since the CEH published its
report, these countries have largely turned their attention elsewhere,
prematurely sending a message to the State of Guatemala that it has
completed its attempt to make amends for abuses that occurred during the
civil war. While myriad governments voiced their collective outrage when
Joerg Haider, a politician with suspected Nazi sympathies, gained
prominence in Austria, 6 the world community has largely failed to
criticize General Rios Montt's return to power as the President of the
Congress of Guatemala. Unless Guatemala faces international pressure to
conduct domestic prosecutions and receives significant financial support
to help defray the costs, impunity for wartime human rights abuses will
continue.
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